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The role of subnational authorities in
the implementation of EU directives
Enrico Borghetto and Fabio Franchino
ABSTRACT Studies on the role of regions in the EU policy process concentrate
mainly on policy formulation and implementation of regional funds. In this
article, we redress this bias by investigating the formal role of subnational authorities
in the implementation of EU regulatory policies, specifically in the transposition of
directives. Subnational authorities play a secondary, but increasingly important, role
in the application of these measures. Their impact is greater on environmental and
social policies, as it is also on public contract legislation. More decentralized states
display higher levels of subnational involvement but, in these states, regional partici-
pation in national policy-making and a high number of regional authorities decrease
the likelihood of finding subnational measures of transposition. There is also more
subnational involvement in states with territories that have both an elected govern-
ment as well as special arrangements regulating their relations with the EU. Finally,
subnational involvement tends to prolong the process of transposition.
KEY WORDS Compliance; directives; federalism; implementation; regions;
transposition.
INTRODUCTION: REGIONALIZATION AND THE EU BETTER
REGULATION AGENDA
Regionalization has been on the increase in the European Union (EU) over the
last two decades.1 According to a recently developed index (Hooghe, Schakel
and Marks 2008), since the early 1990s, 13 EU states increased their regional
authority,2 one country (Belgium) decreased it, and the remaining 13
member states made no change. The process of European integration could
have indirectly contributed to these developments (Bo¨rzel 2002). Certainly,
the EU tried over the years to deal with a growing mobilization of subnational
authorities, which were pushing for more say in its decision-making process
(Hooghe 1995). The most obvious measures were the establishment of the
Committee of the Regions, the rewording in the Maastricht Treaty of Article
203 EC that allowed a member state to be represented in the Council of Min-
isters by a regional government, and the setting-up of procedures to safeguard
the implementation of the subsidiarity principle (Committee of the Regions
2005).
Does this growing regionalization, in conjunction with the greater involve-
ment of subnational actors in the EU policy process, pose a challenge for the
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achievement of the targets set by the ‘better regulation’ agenda? The main
objective of this programme is to improve the quality of EU legislation by
overhauling the process through which rules are created, implemented and
revised (Hardacre 2008). Better rules facilitate correct functioning of the
internal market and achievement of the growth and competitiveness goals of
the Lisbon Strategy (Commission of the EC 2007). A policy analyst committed
to attain a better regulatory environment cannot, therefore, ignore the role that
subnational authorities (SNAs) play (Baliu 2008; Persson and Fandel 2007).
The increasing involvement of SNAs in the EU policy process is both an
opportunity and a risk. Broader participation may be in line with the subsidiar-
ity principle and represent a partial solution for the EU legitimacy problems.
Additionally, consulting street-level implementers provides EU legislators and
the Commission with a more realistic view of what is necessary and feasible
on the ground (To¨mmel 1998). Finally, it gives SNAs an opportunity to
improve their knowledge of EU policy objectives, working methods and instru-
ments, which are no longer considered an external imposition (Commission of
the EC 2001:12–14).
But SNA involvement has its price, too. Their participation at the consul-
tation stage inevitably multiplies the number of conflicting preferences that
have to be aggregated. When a compromise is reached, it may often affect
legal clarity. In implementation, SNAs do not, perhaps, possess an ‘understand-
ing of the EU policy process as a whole, which then enables them to have a
clearer view of potential or actual infringements and the stance the Commission
is likely to take’ (Dimitrakopoulos and Richardson 2001: 339). Tensions may
arise when an EU law envisages a single implementing authority but the com-
petence for dealing with a particular issue is not the exclusive attribute of the
national level (Mandelkern Group on Better Regulation 2001: 50). Addition-
ally, the Commission cannot exert pressure directly on SNAs, because it is
the central government which, under Article 226 EC, is responsible vis-a`-vis
the EU for infringements committed by its subnational authorities. In sum,
SNA involvement represents yet another point in the policy cycle where slip-
pages or outright failures could occur, thus increasing the implementation
deficit that is said to afflict the EU (Mastenbroek 2005).
In light of this discussion, the focus of this article is the formal 3 subnational
involvement in the implementation of EU regulatory policies that take the form
of directives. Whereas there is evidence that the political profile of subnational
actors in the EU is on the rise, this issue has been studied only marginally.
Academic works have dealt primarily with two topics: the role of regional
institutions in the design of policies and in the management of structural
funds. The next section briefly reviews these contributions and presents an over-
view of those works on implementation and compliance that assess the impact
of SNAs. The following section looks at a stage of the implementation process
that is directly relevant to the better regulation agenda: the transposition of EU
directives. This part of the article presents evidence of SNA involvement in the
transposition of directives across time, policy sectors and member states,
760 Journal of European Public Policy
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employing a dataset on national transposition processes covering the time-span
of 1978 to 2004. Thereafter, the article explains the variance in SNA involve-
ment and evaluates its consequences in terms of timeliness of transposition.
SUBNATIONAL AUTHORITIES AS POLICY-TAKERS: THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF EU REGULATORY POLICIES
The literature covering the regional activities in the EU policy process may be
arranged following a widely used partition between upstream (policy formu-
lation and decision) and downstream (implementation) policy processes.
With regard to the role of regions as policy-makers, some researchers have inves-
tigated the channels available to regional authorities which wish to project their
preferences on the European stage, namely their lobbying practices and their
representation in EU institutions such as the Committee of the Regions or
the Council of Ministers (e.g., Bomberg and Peterson 1998; Tatham 2008).
Another group of researchers have studied the formation and effectiveness of
inter-regional associations, formed both within and across the member states
(e.g., Weyand 1997). Finally, others have proposed to investigate those channels
of intermediation with the EU that are presided by central state authorities
(e.g., Jeffery 2000).
With regard to the downstream side of the policy process, most works have
focused on the management of EU regional funds, namely on redistributive pol-
icies. These studies have assessed the policy and institutional outcome of the
implementation of these funds (e.g., Bache 2004; Hooghe 1996). The preva-
lence of this type of research is not a surprise. There is no other policy sector
where regional authorities have come to play a comparable role. Nevertheless,
subnational authorities are also involved in the implementation of EU legis-
lation, which has a predominantly regulatory nature. This area, therefore,
needs further investigation. The remainder of the section will provide an over-
view over those works whose main object of study is, broadly, implementation
and compliance but which take into account the impact of SNAs as well.
In the 1980s, scholars studying the implementation of the single market pro-
gramme already recognized the importance of streamlining the co-ordination
between central and subnational administrations in federal or regional states,
such as Belgium, Germany, Italy and Spain. Siedentopf and Ziller (1988: 45,
60), for instance, observed that these procedures were not yet fully developed
in these states and that the allocation of responsibilities between governmental
levels was unclear, especially in Italy and Belgium, where decentralization was
relatively recent.4 They also observed that ‘the incorporation process reflects a
certain unwillingness of the subnational levels to comply with . . . measures on
whose substance they had had no influence’ (Siedentopf and Ziller 1988: 45).
The second wave of researchers focused on the goodness-of-fit hypothesis,
which argues that the adaptation pressure exerted by the EU on member
states is determined by the degree of fit between EU legal obligations and
either existing national paradigms and administrative traditions (institutional
E. Borghetto and F. Franchino: The role of subnational authorities 761
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misfit) or domestic policy instruments (policy misfit) (e.g., Bo¨rzel and Risse
2003; Knill and Lenschow 1998; see the reviews by Mastenbroek [2005] and
Treib [2008]). Knill and Lenschow (1998), for instance, argue that national
administrative traditions, comprising, among other things, the vertically and
horizontally distributed administrative competences, obstruct the implemen-
tation of environmental directives, particularly when they call for the creation
of an agency whose mandate overlaps regional competence or requires the estab-
lishment of regional co-ordination structures, which were thus far nonexistent.
Haverland (2000), however, has a counterargument to this reasoning. He
argues that the opposition to the packaging directive by La¨nder, channelled
through the Bundesrat, was the central reason for Germany’s poor implemen-
tation of the directive compared to that of the UK and the Netherlands
(where the misfit with the directive was higher). Germany’s strong bicameralism
and federalism provided domestic interests hostile to the directive with a veto
power. Yet, in their research on transport policy in Germany, Italy, Netherlands,
UK and France, He`ritier et al. (2001) conclude that a consensual political lea-
dership may offset the potential obstacles to policy change associated with a
strong subnational tier of government.
Besides the institutional misfit, state-region intergovernmental relations may
play a role as well. According to Bo¨rzel (1998), the better performance of
Germany, compared to that of Spain, in the implementation of some environ-
mental policies may be explained by its co-operative federalism, which favoured
the sharing of implementation costs and the participation of subnational auth-
orities, as opposed to the Spanish competitive regionalism that relied on burden
shifting and limited involvement.
Against the backdrop of this qualitative literature, a few large-N studies have
analysed how the distribution of powers across different levels of government
impacted on compliance performances. The results obtained are mutually con-
tradictory. Mbaye (2001) shows that member states with greater regional auton-
omy are more likely to infringe EU law, but Giuliani (2003) and Jensen (2007)
fail to confirm this finding.5 Linos (2007) and Thomson (2007, 2009) find that
decentralized countries take longer time to comply with social policy directives.
Giuliani (2003) and Haverland and Romeijn (2007), however, find no signifi-
cant association between federalism and delay in transposition. What accounts
for these differences? In some cases, the object of investigation – infringement
or delay – and its measurement differ, while in others the research is limited to a
single policy area or a few countries. Also, these works employ different indexes
of regional autonomy. Nevertheless, in a recent comprehensive analysis of all the
directives adopted between 1986 and 2002, Ko¨nig and Luetgert (2009) confirm
the association between federalism and delay.
In conclusion, since the mid-1980s, the study of transposition consolidated
itself into an important subfield of EU research (Treib 2008). These works
have the merit of drawing attention to the timely and correct transposition of
EU directives, which constitutes a decisive prerequisite for the realization of
the Lisbon Agenda. Nevertheless, despite the recent interest of the Commission
762 Journal of European Public Policy
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(under the better regulation initiative) and of other institutional actors, such as
the Scottish Parliament (European and External Relations Committee 2008),
scholars have so far mostly neglected the subnational dimension.
The next section describes the pattern of formal involvement of SNAs across
time, member states and sectors using an original dataset that allows one to
discriminate between the national and the subnational measures employed to
transpose a large sample of directives.
THE INVOLVEMENT OF SNAS IN THE TRANSPOSITION OF EU
DIRECTIVES: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
We have collected information on 11,859 national measures transposing 733
directives adopted in 15 member states between December 1978 and Decem-
ber 2004 from the CELEX database of the European Union.6 The directives
were selected randomly and the implementing measures classified based on
who adopted them: national parliaments; the cabinet or other executive insti-
tution, such as ministries or national agencies; or subnational authorities. We
excluded national measures that have been adopted on or prior to the date of
adoption of the directive, those without a date of adoption and, for those
member states joining the EU after 1978, the directives which predated the
accession date.7
We considered measures taken only by subnational authorities with an elected
assembly that appoints a regional executive.8 These include mainly the Austrian
and German La¨nder, the Danish and Swedish counties, the Dutch provinces,
the Finnish regions, the Italian provinces and regions and the Spanish auton-
omous communities. They also include the French regions since 1982, the
Greek prefectures since 1984, the Irish county councils and, since 1994,
regional authorities, the Belgian provinces and, as they became more represen-
tative during the 1980s, communities and regions, and finally, the British coun-
ties, when these existed, and its devolved administrations as they increased
powers in the 1990s. Table 1 provides an overview of the number of directives
and subnational measures per member state and some examples of subnational
measures present in our dataset.
The first important finding is that formal subnational involvement in the
transposition of EU directives has been quite a limited phenomenon so far.
We have found at least one subnational act in only 4.3 per cent of the processes
of transposition. Considering only the states listed in Table 1, this figure rises to
7.4 per cent. Nonetheless, there has been an increase in subnational participation
over the years. SNAs were involved in 2.8 per cent of transposition processes up
to the mid-90s. The figure has subsequently moved up to 6.3 per cent, predomi-
nantly because of the enlargement to Finland and Austria and devolution in
Britain.9 Subnational involvement could also have been underestimated,
because, at least for the directives adopted after 2000, our data could be right-
censored in a way that it is biased against subnational measures, which, as will
be shown later, generally take longer time to be adopted.
E. Borghetto and F. Franchino: The role of subnational authorities 763
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We find, therefore, some evidence for the claim of a gradually increasing
formal role for SNAs (Baliu 2008; Commission of the EC 2001; Persson and
Fandel 2007), but this involvement remains a minor cause of the EU transposi-
tion deficit. One could even argue for more subnational participation in policy
formulation, given the rather limited role in implementation.
Figure 1 illustrates SNA involvement across member states, that is, the per-
centage of the national transposition processes of the sampled directives that
include at least one subnational measure. There are indeed some unexpected
results. In Finland, more than one in four directives lists at least one SNA act
among the national transposition measures. However, this is unrelated to the
Finnish regions. It is solely owing to the measures taken by the government
of the A˚land Islands, the autonomous and directly elected province of
Finland, which enjoys a special status and is exempted from some EU policies.
On the other hand, it is somewhat surprising that Britain has the second-largest
share of SNA measures. Besides the measures of the overseas territory of Gibral-
tar, which also enjoys a special status, the creation of devolved governments with
significant policy competence in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland in the
late 1990s strongly regionalized the process of transposition here. On the
Table 1 Measures of subnational authorities
Member state
No.
directives
No. of SNA
measures Examples of subnational measures
Austria 214 235 Landesgesetz, Verordnung der
Landesregierung
Belgium 575 192 Arreˆte´ du Gouvernement (Wallon,
Flammand), Arreˆte´ du
Gouvernement de la Communaute´
franc¸aise
Finland 235 90 Landskapslag, A˚lands
Landskapsstyrelses Beslut,
Landskapsfo¨rordning
Germany 474 169 Landesgesetz, Landesverordnung
Italy 566 12 Legge Regionale, Decreto del
Presidente della Giunta Regionale
Netherlands 496 3 Provinciale Verordening
Portugal 491 3 Decreto Legislativo Regional,
Decreto regulamentar regional
(Madeira, Ac¸ores)
Spain 502 5 Ley de la Comunidad Auto´noma,
Orden de la Comunidad Auto´noma
United Kingdom 528 213 Act, Regulation, Order
Note: We found 9,704 executive, 1,233 legislative and 922 subnational measures.
No subnational measures were found for Denmark (499 directives), France (538),
Greece (527), Ireland (536), Luxembourg (558) and Sweden (208).
764 Journal of European Public Policy
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other hand, the presence of an upper chamber representing the regions (or
states) could explain the lower involvement of SNAs in Germany, Austria
and, to a lesser extent, Belgium, compared to that in Britain and Finland. Direc-
tives may be transposed through federal measures even when policies fall within
regional competence.
It comes as no surprise that old or recent federal states, like Austria, Germany
and Belgium, rank higher than the countries with strong regional authorities
like Spain and Italy (interestingly, Dutch provinces appear to be as involved
in transposition as Spanish or Italian regions). However, this difference
cannot be attributed entirely to the more limited competence devolved in
Spain and Italy. Here, national governments probably take the lead in transpos-
ing the directives if the distribution of policy responsibilities between central
and regional authorities is unclear. But more importantly, the task of activating
20 regional legislative or executive procedures in Italy and 17 in Spain for a
single directive may prove so burdensome that the central government, in
consultation with regional actors via permanent bodies such as the Spanish
conferencias sectoriales and the Italian conferenza stato-regioni, often takes the
responsibility of initiating the whole process (Bindi and Cisci 2005).
In the case of Portugal, regions and districts have weak authority and insti-
tutions. As for the special territory of the A˚land Islands in Finland, subnational
measures are taken solely by the regional governments of the Azores and
Madeira. Unlike Finland, however, and at least until the constitutional revision
of 2004, these measures had to be preceded by acts of the central Portuguese
authorities.
In conclusion, with the exception ofGibraltar, the Italian andDutch provinces,
the authorities most involved are from regions that belong to the Conference of
European regions with legislative power (REGLEG).10 No subnational measures
were found in the remaining member states. French regions,11 Greek prefectures,
Figure 1 SNA involvement per member state
E. Borghetto and F. Franchino: The role of subnational authorities 765
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Danish and Swedish counties, and Irish counties and regions do not seem to play
any formal role in the transposition of the sampled directives. Also, there are no
measures in Luxembourg, where there is no elected regional government.
Moving on to policy areas, Figure 2 illustrates considerable variance in SNA
involvement here. The rather heavy participation in environmental policy can
probably be explained by the strong territorial nature of this sector (see
Brown 1999) – recall that the Fifth Environmental Action Programme in
1993 laid emphasis on shared responsibility, and advocated the involvement
of stakeholders in improving policy effectiveness. The same applies to some
measures in agriculture policy and to the directives regulating the tenders of
public contracts.
Perhaps more surprising is the role of these authorities in the transposition of
social policy directives that deal with protection of workers, working conditions
and safety at work. But social policy is sometimes devolved to the lower tiers of
government in countries where SNAs are important actors. Finally, it should
not come as a surprise that areas that regulate taxation, home affairs, public
health, market transactions and transport tend to exclude SNAs.
EXPLAINING SUBNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT
How does one explain these patterns of SNA participation in the transposition
of directives? A natural expectation is that involvement is more likely in more
decentralized countries. But this observation has to be qualified on at least
two accounts. First, we should expect fewer subnational measures of transposi-
tion in decentralized states where regional governments can, directly or through
their representatives, influence policy at the national level. In other words, where
Figure 2 SNA involvement per policy area
766 Journal of European Public Policy
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regional interests are taken into account in the national decision-making
process, we are likely to see fewer regional measures. Second, regional transposi-
tion is likely to be unwieldy in decentralized states with a large number of
subnational authorities. In these circumstances, we should expect national trans-
position, possibly sustained by co-ordination mechanisms such as state–regions
committees, to replace formal SNA participation.12 In this section, we subject
these two conditional hypotheses to an empirical test.
The dependent variable, subnational involvement, takes a score of one if at
least one national implementing measure is adopted by a subnational authority,
and zero otherwise. We have then selected two frequently used decentralization
indices and the self-rule component of the regional authority index recently
developed by Hooghe, Marks and Schakel (2008). The five-point ordinal
scale of federalism and decentralization of Lijphart (1999: 189) ranks countries
according to whether they are federal and decentralized, federal and centralized,
semi-federal, unitary and decentralized, unitary and centralized. With the excep-
tion of Belgium, the index does not vary over time. Lane and Ersson’s (1999:
187) index of institutional autonomy sums up four discrete components (feder-
alism, special territorial autonomy, functional autonomy and local government
discretion) producing a (time-invariant) five-point decentralization scale. The
self-rule index recently developed by Hooghe et al. (2008; 2008) measures
the authority exercised by a regional government over those living in its terri-
tory, and comprises four dimensions (institutional depth, policy scope, fiscal
autonomy and representation) that are summed up as a 16-point index.
Hooghe, Schakel and Marks (2008) produce a score for each regional reform
from 1950 to 2006.
To measure the influence that regional governments exercise at the national
level, we employ the shared rule component of Hooghe, Marks and Schakel’s
(2008) regional authority index. Shared rule measures the authority exercised
by a regional government or its representatives in the country as a whole and
comprises four dimensions (law-making, executive control, fiscal control and
constitutional reform) to produce a 10-point index for the 1950–2006 time
period. In decentralized countries, we expect less subnational involvement in
transposition as shared rule increases.
For the second expectation, we have counted, for each country and relevant
time period, the number of SNAs at the highest tier of regional government,
but above communes and municipalities, with an elected assembly that appoints
a regional executive.13 For instance, until 1979, we have counted the 10 Belgian
provinces and, as they increased representativeness from 1980 onwards, the
regions and communities. In decentralized countries, we expect less subnational
involvement in transposition as the number of SNAs increases.
We also include a set of control variables. Firstly, we add dummy variables for
policies, as listed in Figure 2, using taxation and home affairs as the reference
category. Second, as can be seen from the descriptive statistics, several
member states have special relations with some territories across the world
whose measures are listed in our dataset. We employ, therefore, special territory
E. Borghetto and F. Franchino: The role of subnational authorities 767
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as a dummy variable that takes the value of one for member states with outer-
most regions or other special territories that only partially apply EU law and
have an elected government.14 However, since Hooghe, Schakel and Marks’s
(2008) self-rule index specifically takes into account special autonomous
regions, whereas it is unclear whether other indicators do, we exclude this
control variable in the regression with this index.
As directives are adopted at the supranational level and then transposed by the
member states, the structure of our dataset appears hierarchical. Policy dummies
are directive-level observations, while the three decentralization indices, shared
rule, the number of SNAs and special territory, are country-level observations
nested into the directive level. To assess whether there is significant variation
in the probability of subnational involvement at the directive level, we estimated
a two-level random effects analysis of variance (ANOVA) model.15 The coeffi-
cient of the directive-level variance component is 0.16 with a standard error of
0.015 (state-level, N ¼ 6,947; directive-level, N ¼ 733). This value is greater
than zero at a significance level above 0.01, implying that a significant
proportion of the variance in the probability of subnational involvement is
attributable to differences between directives, supporting the expectation that
our dataset is structured into two levels. We therefore estimate two-level
probit models with random-intercept and robust standard errors for data
clustered at the state level to account for correlation within each country.
Table 2 illustrates the regression results. The substantive interpretation of the
coefficients of a probit model, especially if it contains interaction terms, is not
straightforward. For instance, the marginal effect of the decentralization indices
on the probability of subnational involvement depends on the values of the con-
ditioning (i.e., shared rule and the number of SNAs) as well as dummy variables.
The three coefficients of the decentralization indices in Table 2 are positive and
significant as expected, indicating that greater decentralization increases the like-
lihood of subnational involvement when shared rule equals zero and subnational
authorities do not exist. This, however, is substantively less meaningful because
only France, Greece and Luxembourg display these features but none of them
has subnational transposition measures. Nevertheless, suffice it to say that the
majority of the countries with no subnational measures display below average
levels of decentralization, while the majority of the top five countries listed in
Figure 1 have above average levels of decentralization.16
To test the validity of the first conditional hypothesis, we mapped in Figure 3
the marginal effect and the 95 per cent confidence intervals of an increase in
shared rule (specifically six units, slightly less than two standard deviations,
which is the difference between Spain and Germany) on the likelihood of
subnational involvement in the transposition of an environmental directive
across the different degrees of decentralization.17 The top two charts conform
to the expectation. In more decentralized countries, we are less likely to find
subnational measures if regional authorities have greater influence in the
country as a whole. Providing real-life examples is difficult because countries
simultaneously vary along the degree of shared rule and several other
768 Journal of European Public Policy
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Table 2 The determinants of formal SNA involvement in transposition. Dependent variable: subnational involvement
Parameters I II III
Fixed Effects
Intercept 25.017 (0.381)∗∗ 25.354 (0.386)∗∗ 23.737 (0.392)∗
Decentralization indices:
Lijphart 0.829 (0.077)∗∗ 2 2
Lane and Ersson 2 0.843 (0.078)∗∗ 2
Self rule (Hooghe et al.) 2 2 0.070 (0.005)∗∗
Shared rule 0.131 (0.031)∗∗ 20.244 (0.081)∗∗ 0.014 (0.027)
Number of SNAs 0.069 (0.006)∗∗ 0.060 (0.005)∗∗ 0.067 (0.004)∗∗
Shared rule × Lijphart 20.041 (0.007)∗∗ 2 2
× Lane and Ersson 2 0.033 (0.022) 2
× Self rule (Hooghe et al.) 2 2 20.0002 (0.002)
No. of SNAs × Lijphart 20.051 (0.005)∗∗ 2 2
× Lane and Ersson 2 20.039 (0.005)∗∗ 2
× Self rule (Hooghe et al.) 2 2 20.006 (0.0004)∗∗
Special territory 1.136 (0.070)∗∗ 1.328 (0.091)∗∗ 2
Agriculture 1.071 (0.362)∗∗ 1.098 (0.347)∗∗ 1.012 (0.385)∗∗
Environment 1.694 (0.410)∗∗ 1.721 (0.378)∗∗ 1.580 (0.373)∗∗
Industry and trade 0.962 (0.398)∗ 0.975 (0.328)∗∗ 0.892 (0.351)∗
Public administration 1.238 (0.472)∗ 1.240 (0.558)∗ 1.251 (0.588)∗
Public health 0.730 (0.569) 0.732 (0.278)∗ 0.689 (0.527)
Social affairs 1.545 (0.396)∗∗ 1.634 (0.429)∗∗ 1.426 (0.365)∗∗
Transport 0.700 (0.302)∗ 0.709 (0.403) 0.667 (0.401)
Random Effects
Variance, intercept 0.123 (0.044)∗ 0.144 (0.031)∗ 0.113 (0.040)∗
Log-likelihood 21039.834 21019.329 21090.719
Notes: Two-level probit regressions with random-intercept and robust standard errors clustered on country level. N ¼ 6,947 (directive-
level N=733). ∗∗ ¼ p , 0.01, ∗ ¼ p , 0.05. Policy reference category: taxation and home affairs.
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dimensions. Nevertheless, we would be between 2 and 2.5 per cent less likely to
find subnational measures of transposition if a decentralized country like Austria
increases the degree of shared rule by a standard deviation. This is equivalent to
the difference between Austria and the similarly decentralized Belgium, and this
may account for the more limited involvement in transposition of Belgian com-
munities and regions as compared to Austrian La¨nder, despite fewer SNAs in
Belgium. These results should be interpreted somewhat cautiously, however,
because the expectation finds no support when self-rule is used as the
measure of decentralization.
The second hypothesis is more convincingly validated, as can be seen from
Figure 4. The figure illustrates the marginal effect and confidence intervals of
an increase in the number of subnational authorities (specifically 11 units,
slightly less than a standard deviation, which is equivalent to the difference
between Austria and Italy) on the likelihood of subnational involvement
across the degrees of decentralization. In more decentralized countries, we are
less likely to find subnational measures as the number of SNAs increases. If
the number of Belgian SNAs increases from the current 5 to 16 (as in Spain),
we would be 10.3 to 19.2 per cent less likely to find subnational measures in
Belgium.
With regard to the remaining factors, we are 11.8 to 15.8 per cent more likely
to find subnational measures when states have territories that enjoy a special
relationship with the EU. These regional authorities need to adopt and commu-
nicate to the EU their own measures, which are likely to differ from those of
their national governments. Finally, as already seen in Figure 2, environmental
and social policy directives are 3.0 to 9.6 per cent more likely to involve SNAs in
transposition. Measures on public administration, agriculture and industry are
also significantly more likely to involve SNAs than do the home affairs and
taxation directives; however, it is less so in the case of public health and transport
directives.
THE CONSEQUENCES OF SUBNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT
What are the consequences of involving subnational authorities in the transpo-
sition of directives? Does SNA involvement prolong transposition and compli-
ance with EU law? In this section, we take as our unit of analysis the national
measures transposing the directives and we analyse the timing of their adoption.
As several observations have only the year of adoption, our time variable, trans-
position, counts the number of calendar years that elapsed between the adoption
of the directive and the adoption of the national measure, starting with the value
of one if the two adoptions fall in the same calendar year. To avoid the risk of
selection bias (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 19), directives without
national implementing measures in 2006 are treated as right-censored obser-
vations. A total of 3,053 national transposition processes fall into this category.
As explained earlier, the implementing measures have been classified depend-
ing on who adopted them: the legislature; the executive; or subnational
E. Borghetto and F. Franchino: The role of subnational authorities 771
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Figure 4 The impact of the number of SNAs on subnational involvement at different
levels of decentralization
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authorities. This classification allows us to generate two dichotomous explana-
tory variables, subnational measure for implementing acts adopted by a subna-
tional authority, and legislative measure for those adopted by the national
parliament, leaving executive acts as the reference category.
The former variable is measured at the level of the national acts transposing a
directive in a country. Earlier works that analyse the implications of decentrali-
zation for compliance employ coarser indices that do not vary across the direc-
tives implemented within a country (Giuliani 2003; Haverland and Romeijn
2007; Ko¨nig and Luetgert 2009; Linos 2007; Thomson 2007, 2009).
Legislative measure instead allows us to control for the impact of parliamentary
involvement on transposition. As in the case of decentralization, the results do
not seem to point in the same direction. Berglund et al. (2006), for utilities
and food safety, and Haverland and Romeijn (2007), for social policy, do not
find any association between parliamentary involvement and delay, while, in
their more comprehensive study, Ko¨nig and Luetgert (2009) find a significant
negative relation between legislative participation and delay. In the Netherlands,
involvement delays transposition initially but accelerates it later (Mastenbroek
2003). However, in Italy (Borghetto et al. 2006) and in maritime policy
(Steunenberg and Kaeding 2009), it behaves in the opposite way.18
We include other control variables that are used in the literature as well.
Commission directive is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for a
Commission directive and zero for a Council or Parliament (where involved)
directive, while amending directive takes the value of one if the directive
amends an existing EU law. Deadline is a time-varying covariate that takes
the value of one in risk periods where the deadline for transposing a given direc-
tive has expired. These factors should accelerate transposition (Borghetto et al.
2006; Mastenbroek 2003; Steunenberg and Kaeding 2009; c.f. Haverland and
Romeijn 2007). Finally, we include dummy variables for each member state.
The transposition of a directive may involve the adoption of more than one
national measure without a predetermined sequence. The primary interest of
this study is in the relationship between the covariates and transposition, and
no explicit inferences need to be made about duration dependency. Therefore,
as recommended by Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004), we employ the Cox
proportional hazards model with robust standard errors clustered on the
directives.19
Table 3 illustrates the regression results, while Figure 5 maps the effect of the
covariates on the likelihood of adopting national measures over a given time
period after the adoption of the directive. The most important finding is that
involvement of SNAs decreases the hazard ratio; in other words, it prolongs
the process of transposition. Subnational measures are two-and-a-half times
less likely of being adopted within the same calendar year of adoption of the
directive than other types of national implementing measures. The change in
the hazard rate becomes positive; that is, subnational measures are more likely
to be adopted, only after more than two years. But only 36 per cent of national
measures are adopted after this time period, which is well beyond the mean
E. Borghetto and F. Franchino: The role of subnational authorities 773
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deadline of one year for transposition. This evidence lends support, at the finer
level of the single national implementing measure, to the broader association
between federalism and delay (Ko¨nig and Luetgert 2009; Linos 2007;
Thomson 2007, 2009).
Legislative measures, on the other hand, do not seem to make a significant
difference initially but, after a year, they speed up transposition and are increas-
ingly more likely to be adopted than other type of implementation acts (86 per
cent of the observations fall within this time frame). This lends conditional
support to other works. The initial insignificance of the coefficient is in line
with the analyses of Berglund et al. (2006) and Haverland and Romeijn
(2007), but, over time, it confirms the accelerating impact found by Ko¨nig
Table 3 Involvement of SNAs and timing of adoption of national implementing
measures. Dependent variable: transposition
Covariates
Subnational measure 20.896∗∗ (0.220)
Subnational measure ∗ ln(t) 0.929∗∗ (0.146)
Legislative measure 20.036 (0.118)
Legislative measure ∗ ln(t) 0.489∗∗ (0.086)
Commission directive 1.135∗∗ (0.103)
Commission directive ∗ ln(t) 20.671∗∗ (0.092)
Amending directive 0.361∗∗ (0.137)
Amending directive ∗ ln(t) 20.387∗∗ (0.104)
Deadline 0.109 (0.171)
Deadline ∗ ln(t) 20.156 (0.175)
Belgium 20.175∗ (0.074)
Denmark 0.104 (0.077)
Finland 0.302∗∗ (0.074)
France 0.030 (0.070)
Germany 20.200∗ (0.081)
Greece 20.160∗ (0.072)
Ireland 20.112 (0.072)
Italy 20.143 (0.073)
Luxembourg 20.112 (0.072)
The Netherlands 20.031 (0.076)
Portugal 0.022 (0.069)
Spain 0.152∗ (0.074)
Sweden 0.131 (0.074)
United Kingdom 0.074 (0.076)
Log-likelihood 2108065.71
Notes: Cox proportional hazard model. ∗∗ ¼ p , 0.01, ∗ ¼ p , 0.05. Robust
estimators, standard errors in parenthesis adjusted for clustering on directives.
Breslow method for ties. Subjects (N) 15,153, failures (transposed directives)
12,100. Reference category for types of implementation acts: executive
measures. Member state reference category: Austria.
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and Luetgert (2009), whose results, however, are not conditional on time, and,
especially, Mastenbroek (2003).
As expected, Commission directives are three times more likely of being trans-
posed in the same calendar year of their adoption than are the Council (and
Parliament) directives. The change in the hazard ratio decreases, but remains
significant and positive for the next three years. Also in line with previous
studies, amending directives are almost one-and-a-half times more likely of
being transposed within the same calendar year of their adoption than the
non-amending measures are. The change in hazard ratio turns significantly
negative in both cases, but this occurs only quite a few years after adoption.
This is substantively irrelevant to more than 80 per cent of the sample. The
last notable result is the irrelevance of the deadline covariate. Passing the trans-
position deadline does not seem to speed up implementation.
CONCLUSION
Regionalization expanded across the European Union in the last two decades,
and several institutional innovations were made at the EU level to accommodate
regional demands for more influence on supranational policy-making. So far,
the focus of academic work has predominantly been on the role of SNAs in
the formulation and implementation of EU regional policy. This bias is
Figure 5 Effects of covariates on the timing of adoption of national implementing
measures
E. Borghetto and F. Franchino: The role of subnational authorities 775
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Fr
an
ch
in
o,
 F
ab
io
][
Un
iv
er
si
ty
 o
f 
Mi
la
n]
 A
t:
 0
8:
58
 2
3 
Au
gu
st
 2
01
0
addressed in this article by investigating the involvement of subnational auth-
orities in the implementation of regulatory policies, specifically in the transposi-
tion of directives.
Subnational authorities play a secondary but increasingly important formal
role in the implementation of these measures. Their influence is greater on
environmental and social policies, as well as on public contract legislation.
Moreover, some subnational measures have been found transposing directives
on other policy fields, such as agriculture, industry and trade. Although more
decentralized states display higher levels of subnational involvement, regional
participation in national policy-making and a large number of regional auth-
orities decrease the likelihood of finding subnational measures of transposition.
Furthermore, there is more subnational involvement in states with territories
that have both an elected government and special relations with the EU.
Finally, in light of the better regulation agenda, subnational involvement
tends to prolong the process of transposition, especially if new Council (and
Parliament) directives need transposition.
In conclusion, the study of the role of subnational authorities in implemen-
tation is a promising research avenue. For instance, closer attention should be
paid to SNA involvement when the responsibility for transposition lies formally
at the national level. Last but not least, the issue confronts policy-makers with an
important trade-off. On the one hand, greater SNA involvement is welcome to
the extent that it increases participation and may improve policy design. On the
other hand, this participation may jeopardize the creation of a level playing field
by, for instance, prolonging transposition. After all, a free lunch does not seem
to exist in politics either.
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NOTES
1 Regionalisation is a process of power decentralisation from the state to a regional
authority defined as a ‘territorial entity situated between the local and national
levels which has a capacity for authoritative decision making’ (Marks et al. 2008:
113). In this work, the terms region and subnational authority are used interchange-
ably. Additionally, although the empirical section of this work is centred solely on
the European Community pillar of the Treaty on European Union, the terms Euro-
pean Union and EU are used throughout, instead of European Community.
2 These are the Czech Republic, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania,
the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain and the UK.
3 Involvement is formal when SNAs directly adopt national measures of implemen-
tation. It is informal if SNAs are merely consulted by central state authorities.
4 See also Rhodes (1986) and, for a recent similar argument related to the divergent
transposition performances of unitary (Denmark) and federal (Belgium) states,
Bursens (2002).
5 The results reported by Lampinen and Uusikyla¨ (1998) are more difficult to inter-
pret. The variable ‘political institutions’ is significantly associated with the failure to
implement directives. But this is an index composed of 13 factors; it is therefore dif-
ficult to discern the impact of regional autonomy, which is one of the building
blocks, from that of other components.
6 CELEX was no longer accessible after this cut-off point. Its content was migrated to
the EUR-Lex database, available at http://www.eur-lex.europa.eu. The CELEX
manual states that parts of the database are incomplete (e.g., sector 5 on preparatory
acts before 1984) but this does not apply to the two sectors from which information
was collected (sector 5 on secondary legislation and sector 7 on national implement-
ing measures). For instance, the database lists 341 directives adopted in the five years
prior to 1984 and 410 directives in the following five years. A mere difference of 70
directives (14 directives per year) between the period of ‘Eurosclerosis’ (pre-1984)
and that of implementation of the single market programme (between 1984 and
1988) does not seem to indicate that the record is incomplete before 1984. See
Ko¨nig and Luetgert (2009: 170–2) for a discussion on the reliability of this data-
base.
7 From an initial random sample of 821 directives, 733 directives display at least one
national implementing measure adopted in at least one member state after the date
of adoption of the directive. This sample is quite representative of the Eur-Lex data-
base. We have 314 Commission directives (38.6 per cent), while the database lists
872 Commission directives out of a total of 2,358 directives adopted in the same
time period (37 per cent); 258 and 262 are agricultural and internal market
measures respectively (31.4 and 31.9 per cent) compared to 769 and 914 (32.6
and 38.9 per cent) respectively in the database.
8 In other words, authorities with a representation score of at least 1,1 in the index
developed by Hooghe, Marks and Schakel (2008).
9 Had the observations gone further back to the 1970s, one might have observed a rise
in subnational involvement following the establishment of the Belgian communities
and regions. On the other hand, it is difficult to speculate on the consequences of the
last two enlargements on subnational involvement. Six of the twelve new member
E. Borghetto and F. Franchino: The role of subnational authorities 777
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states display some degree of regional authority (Hooghe, Schakel and Marks 2008),
but none has joined REGLEG (see Note 10).
10 REGLEG is an association of 73 regions with legislative power across eight member
states (Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the UK).
11 Eight French arreˆte´s pre´fectoral transposing Council Directive 82/883 are considered
national executive measures because they were issued by prefects who are central
state representatives in a department or region.
12 Of course, these dynamics are not at work in more centralized countries where one
simply expects less subnational involvement.
13 In other words, with a representation score of at least 1,1 (Hooghe, Schakel and
Marks 2008).
14 These are Finland (A˚land), France (French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique),
Germany (Bu¨singen am Hochrhein, Heligoland), Great Britain (Channel Islands,
Isle of Man, Gibraltar), Italy (Campione d’Italia, Livigno), Portugal (Azores,
Madeira) and Spain (Canary Islands, Ceuta, Melilla). Mount Athos is also a
special territory but its civil governor is appointed by the Greek minister of
foreign affairs. Overseas countries and territories are disregarded because they are
not part of the EU and their relationship is governed by association agreements.
15 This analysis of cross-level variation follows Steenbergen and Jones (2002: 224,
231). We opted for a binomial model with a probit link function because subna-
tional involvement reflects an underlying interval variable. Hence, its cumulative dis-
tribution is normal.
16 A table listing the marginal effect of the decentralisation indices and its standard
error for each member state is available from the authors.
17 The marginal effects and confidence intervals have been produced following the
code developed by Brambor et al. (2006). We took 10,000 draws from the estimated
coefficients and the variance-covariance matrix. In Figure 3, number of SNAs is set at
15, while in Figure 4 shared rule is set at 2.4.
18 Since legislative measure and subnational measure cannot be observed for directives
without national implementing measures, these observations drop out from the
analysis.
19 As post-estimation diagnostic tests, we have employed the link test and inspected the
Cox–Snell residuals to assess the appropriateness of the Cox specification. Each cov-
ariate was also plotted against the martingale residuals to assess if their functional
form was correct. Finally, we used the Schoenfeld residuals to test if the covariates
violated the proportional hazards assumption and, following Box-Steffensmeier and
Jones (2004: 131–7), we interacted the offending covariates with the natural logar-
ithm of time. The results also hold if these covariates are interacted with time only,
rather than with its natural logarithm.
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